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TORTS-NEGLIGENT

HIRING AND RETENTION-

AVAILABILITY OF ACTION LIMITED BY FORESEEABILITY REQUIREMENT. F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M.
697, 594 P.2d 745 (1979).

In F & T Co. v. Woods,' the New Mexico Supreme Court joined a
growing number of courts in other jurisdictions' which recognize
causes of action against an employer for negligent hiring and retention of employees. 3 However, the court severely limited their scope.
This Note reviews the Supreme Court's treatment of these tort conI. 92 N.M. 697, 594 P.2d 745 (1979).
2. Becken v. Manpower, Inc., 532 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1976); Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236
F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Argonne Apartment House Co. v. Garrison, 42 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir.
1930); Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951); Svacek v. Shelley, 359
P.2d 127 (Alaska 1961); Mallory v. O'Neil, 69 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1954); Rosenberg v. Packerland
Packing Co., 13 III. 208, 370 N.E.2d 1235 (1977); Tathum v. Wabash Ry. Co., 42 II1. 568, 107
N.E.2d 735 (1952); Murray v. Modoc State Bank, 181 Kan. 642, 313 P.2d 304 (1957); Hersh v.
Kentfield Builders, Inc., 385 Mich. 410, 189 N.W.2d 286 (1971); Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich.
556, 46 N.W.2d 382 (1951); Priest v. F. W. Woolworth Five & Ten Cent Store, 228 Mo. Ct.
App. 23, 62 S.W.2d 926 (1933); Stevens v. Lankard, 31 A.D.2d 602, 297 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1968),
aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 640, 254 N.E.2d 339, 306 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1969); Vanderhule v. Berinstein, 285
A.D. 290, 136 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1954), modified, 284 A.D. 1089, 136 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1954);
Mistletoe Express Serv., Inc. v. Culp, 353 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1960); Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15
Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d 910 (1963); LaLone v. Smith, 39 Wash. 2d 1967, 234 P.2d 893 (1951). See
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B, Comment e, example D (1965), where this type of
liability is recognized "where the actor has brought into contact or association with the other
person whom the actor knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional
misconduct, under circumstances which afford a peculiar opportunity or temptation for such
misconduct."
3. The theory of negligent hiring emerged from the fellow servant rule which imposed a duty
on the employer to hire employees capable of performing their work without endangering
fellow employees. This rule was extended to include an employer's duty to exercise reasonable
care for the safety of members of the general public who come in contact with his employees.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1957); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 372, 390 (1954). To fulfill
this duty the employer must use due care to avoid selecting or retaining an employee whom he
knew or should have known is unfit to deal with the employer's customers, patrons, or other
invitees. Id. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213, Comment d (1957). Note too that the
scope of persons to whom the employer owes this duty of reasonable care has been expanding
through case law. See Fleming v. Brofin, 80 A.2d 915 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951) (where the
court held that the employer owed a duty to customers who might come in contact with an
employee away from the place of business, to hire and retain safe employees); Svacek v.
Shelley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1961) (where the court held that an employer-landlord owed a
duty to a tenant and other members of the public, while on the premises of the employer, to
hire and retain safe and competent employees); Priest v. F. W. Woolworth Five & Ten Cent
Store, 228 Mo. App. 23, 62 S.W.2d 926 (1933) (where the court held that an employer-retail
;tore owner owed a business invitee a duty to use ordinary care in the selection of employees).
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cepts in Woods and discusses the policy concerns which might have
influenced the court's decision.
PROCEDURE
On August 30, 1973, Sanders, in the course of his employment,
delivered a television set to the home of Ann Woods." Two days
later, Sanders returned to Woods' home and raped her. 5 At the time
of his employment by defendant, Sanders was on parole from the
New Mexico State Penitentiary where he had previously served ten
years of a life sentence for unarmed robbery, kidnapping, and child
rape. 6 Sanders had been hired by Houliston, F & T's hiring agent,
who knew that Sanders was on parole for unarmed robbery."
Houliston also may have known that Sanders was on parole from
kidnapping and child rape convictions.' Evidence also showed that
before Woods was raped, Houliston might have been aware that
Sanders was under investigation in a rape case.'
Woods alleged that F & T Company was negligent in hiring and in
retaining Sanders as a deliveryman because defendant "knew or
should have known" of Sanders' dangerous propensities.'" The first
trial resulted in a hung jury and mistrial." In the second trial, the
jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded damages of
$48,100.' 2 On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's judgment on the negligent hiring theory.' 3 The court
of appeals concluded that it should not have been submitted to the
jury. "4It also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to submit
the negligent retention theory to the jury, and remanded the case for
a new trial on that issue. '
On review, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the court of
4. F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. at 698, 594 P.2d at 746.
5. Id.
6. Woods v. F&T Co., 17 N.M. St. B. Bull. 2730 (Ct. App. Sept. 7,1978).
7. Id. at 2731. There were disputes concerning to whom Houliston had talked about
Sanders, and what he knew.
8. Though disputed at trial, the court of appeals accepted, for purposes of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to the jury, the inference that Houliston knew of Sanders'
conviction of child rape. 17 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 2731-32.
9. Id. at 2743.
10. 92 N.M. at 699,594 P.2d at 747.
11. Brief for Appellee in Support of a Motion for Rehearing, at 1, Woods v. F & T Co., 17
N.M. St. B. Bull. 2730 (Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1978).
12. Id.
13. Woods v. F & TCo., 17 N.M. St. B. Bull. 2730 (Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1978).
14. Id. at 2743.
15. ld. at 2744.
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appeals' dismissal of the claim for negligent hiring, but reversed its
decision that there was sufficient basis for finding the defendant
guilty of negligent retention. The case was remanded for the entry of
judgment for defendant. 6
RATIONALE
In F & T Co. v. Woods, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized both negligent hiring and negligent retention as valid causes of
action and applied the "knew or should have known" standard of
liability.' 7 The court acknowledged that a factual issue had been
raised as to whether Houliston had exercised ordinary care in selecting Sanders as a deliveryman, but concluded that his failure to inquire about Sanders' background had not been established as the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. 11
The court equated foreseeability with proximate cause and held
that "their applicability is the same,"' 9 thereby apparently limiting
liability to that which is foreseeable. The Uniform Jury Instruction
definition of proximate cause,"0 cited approvingly by the court, does
not contain the foreseeability limitation; the court relied on the case
of Bouldin v. Sategna,2' however, to demonstrate that a lack of
foreseeability can limit liability. The defendant in Bouldin left the
keys in his truck, which was subsequently stolen and involved in an
accident. The supreme court held in Bouldin that, as a matter of law,
no proximate cause existed between the negligent act of leaving the
keys in the truck and the accident because the accident was not
16. F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. at 699, 594 P.2d at 747.
17. The "knew or should have known" standard has been used in a great number of
negligent hiring and retention cases. Application of the "knew or should have known" standard becomes a question for the jury. The jury must determine whether an employer was
negligent because he had sufficient actual or constructive knowledge of the employee's
dangerousness. Svacek v. Shelley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1961); Mallory v. O'Neil, 69 So. 2d
313 (Fla. 1954); Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964);
Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W.2d 382 (1951); Vanderhule v. Berinstein, 285 A.D.
290, 136 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1954), modified, 284 A.D. 290, 136 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1954). Contra, Dantos v. Community Theatres Co., 90 Ga. App. 195, 82 S.E.2d 260 (1954).
18. 92N.M. at 701, 594 P.2d at 747.
19. Id. at700, 594 P.2d at 748.
20. N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 12.10, which provides: "The proximate cause of an injury is that which
in a natural and continuous sequence . . . produces the injury, and without which the injury
would not have occurred."
21. 71 N.M. 329, 378 P.2d 370 (1963). Two other cases, Marchiando v. Roper, 90 N.M. 367,
563 P.2d 1160 (1977) and Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966), were cited by the
supreme court to illustrate a situation where liability was denied due to a lack of proximate
cause. In Marchiando, however, the court indicated it was bound by common law to find no
proximate cause, but indicated it would act to impose liability in the future if the legislature
failed to address the question. 90 N.M. at 369, 563 P.2d at 1162.
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reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.2" The court acknowledged
in Bouldin that the determination of foreseeability is ordinarily a
question of fact for the jury, but added, "where reasonable minds
cannot differ, the question is one of law to be resolved by the
judge." '23
The court in Woods concluded that reasonable minds could not
differ on the question of foreseeability and held, as a matter of law,
that Sanders' act was not reasonably foreseeable by defendant at the
time it hired Sanders." ' The court also held, as a matter of law, that
defendant could not have reasonably foreseen that its retaining
Sanders would lead to the rape of Woods.2" Both determinations
were made by the court without further reasoning. The court's
failure to reveal its rationale provides trial judges with no guidance
for determining in future cases whether foreseeability is a question
which should be decided by the jury as an issue of fact or resolved by
the court as a matter of law.
The court's review of the denial of a directed verdict for the defendant in Woods warrants close analysis. New Mexico law requires the
reviewing court to resolve evidentiary conflicts in favor of the
resisting party and to accept the inference or interpretation most
favorable to that party." The court unaccountably ignored conflicting testimony in Woods which supported plaintiff's contention that
defendant should have foreseen Sanders' conduct. 7 The court's
refusal, as a matter of law, to permit a finding of proximate cause
and its conclusion that defendant's motion for a directed verdict
should have been granted indicate a desire to assure that the
judiciary can control the scope of liability for negligent hiring and
retention. Why the court insisted upon such tight judicial control of
the causes of action is less clear.
The vague and uncertain legal reasoning in Woods reflects the
22. 71 N.M. at 329, 378 P.2d at 370.
23. Id.at 334, 378 P.2d at 373.
24. 92 N.M. at 701, 594 P.2d at 749.
25. Id.
26. Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977); McGuire v. Pearson, 78
N.M. 357,431 P.2d 735 (1967); Monden v. Elms, 73 N.M. 256,387 P.2d 458 (1963).
27. Evidence indicated that Officer Leyba had questioned Houliston about Sanders in connection with a rape investigation. Answer Brief of Appellee Ann Woods, at 4, Woods v. F & T
Co., 17 N.M. St. B. Bull. 2730 (Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1978). Leyba's discussion with Houliston was
open to several inferences, including an inference that Houliston had deduced from Leyba's
questions that Sanders was a suspect in a rape case. This inference, which was more favorable
to the resisting party, was available to the court; yet it accepted the alternative inference that
Houliston had no actual knowledge of Leyba's suspicions concerning Sanders.
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court's concern with fundamental questions of policy which may
have had a greater influence on the court's decision than the
simplistic verbal formula defining proximate cause. The court
revealed one interest which it sought to protect: the right of private
and governmental employers to hire parolees without becoming "an
insurer of the safety of any person who may at any time have had a
customer relationship with that employer." 2 8 Other policy considerations, which were not articulated in the court's opinion, but

which perhaps influenced the decision, were raised in an amicus
brief filed by the attorney general on behalf of the state.
The amicus brief argued against the imposition of liability on a
variety of public policy grounds. The state contended that imposing
liability on the employer would discourage employers from offering
employment to those eligible for, or on parole. Thus, it would
hamper the state's parole program which seeks to promote employment for parolees in furtherance of its goal of rehabilitation.2 9 The
state also argued that imposing liability on employers who hire persons with criminal records would conflict with legislative policy concerning employment of former criminal offenders.3 0 The Criminal
Offenders Employment Act3" expresses a legislative intent to encourage employment of past criminal offenders to aid in their rehabilitation, thereby benefiting both the public and the former offender."
To allow recovery in Woods, the state reasoned, would deter potential employers from hiring past criminal offenders, thereby substantially diminishing the employment prospects of these offenders, and

28. 92 N.M. at 701, 594 P.2d at 749. The court may have overestimated the effect of a finding of liability in Woods. To permit the jury to find the employer liable in Woods would not
make employers insurers of customers' safety; it would merely permit a jury to sometimes find
that an employer who had been negligent in hiring or retaining an employee could be held liable
to a customer injured by that employee. As pointed out in Chief Justice Sosa's dissent, such a
finding of causal connection falls within the "province of the jury." 92 N.M. at 702, 594 P.2d
at 750 (Sosa, C. J., dissenting).
29. Brief of the State of New Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant,
at 4, Woods v. F & T Co., 17 N.M. St. B. Bull. 2730 (Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1978). See Probation
and Parole Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-21-3 to -19 (1978). The importance of employment in
rehabilitation is expressed in the Criminal Offenders Employment Act, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-2-1 to -6 (1978).
30. Brief of the State of New Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant
at 4.
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-2-1 to -6 (1978).
32. "The legislature finds that the public is best protected when criminal offenders or exconvicts are given the opportunity to secure employment or to engage in a lawful trade, occupation or profession and that barriers to such employment should be removed to make
rehabilitation feasible." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-2-2 (1978).
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frustrating legislative intent;3 3 such effects would be harmful to
society.

The state also raised the possibility that, as a result of its waiver of

sovereign immunity in the Tort Claims Act,3 ' it could be threatened
with liability for paroling a person who later injured someone. The
state reasoned that if the employer were held liable for hiring the
criminal offender, the parole board and parole officers who permitted or encouraged that decision could also be held liable." The
state was concerned that the effectiveness of its parole system would
be diminished by the threat of liability for its unavoidable errors.3 6
The state's role as employer-defendant in negligent hiring and reten-

tion actions, although not mentioned in the amicus brief, may also
have concerned the state and the court. As the largest employer in
New Mexico, with a stated policy of hiring past criminal offenders, 37
the state might well be the most frequent target of such suits.
Plaintiff responded in his answer brief by arguing that the parole
program was "effectively abandoned" under the recently enacted
Criminal Sentencing Act and that it no longer required the court's

protection.38 Plaintiff also asserted that the district court decision in
33. The Probation and Parole Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-10(A) (1978), provides for
parole for a prisoner who can give evidence of having secured gainful employment.
A. The board may release on parole any person confined in any correctional
institution administered by state authorities, except persons under sentence of
death, when the prisonergives evidence of having securedgainful employment or
satisfactory evidence of self-support, and the board finds in its opinion the
prisoner can be released without detriment to himself or to the community.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-4-1 to -26 (1978).
35. Cases in which the parole authorities were named as defendants in similar actions include: Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Semlar v. Psychiatric
Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
36. Brief of the State of New Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant
at 3.
37. The Criminal Offenders Employment Act, supra notes 31-32, applies only to state entities and entities licensed by the state. It requires these employers to hire employees with
criminal records under certain circumstances.
38. Answer Brief to the Amicus Curiae Brief of the State of New Mexico, at 1, Woods v.
F & T Co., 17 N.M. St. B. Bull. 2730 (Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1978). The Criminal Sentencing Act,
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-18-12 to-21 (Supp. 1979) provides:
A. If a person is convicted of a noncapital felony, the basic sentence of imprisonment is as follows:
(1) for a first degree felony, eighteen years imprisonment;
(2) for a second degree felony, nine years imprisonment;
(3) for a third degree felony, three years imprisonment; or
(4) for a fourth degree felony, eighteen months imprisonment.
B. The appropriate basic sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed upon a
person convicted of a first, second, third or fourth degree felony unless the court
alters such sentence pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15.1, 31-18-16 or
31-18-17 NMSA 1978.
C. The court shall include in the judgment and basic sentence of each person
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Woods, which permitted recovery against an employer, had not impaired parolee employment. 3 9
Perhaps the court found the state's arguments persuasive, but did
not wish to universally exonerate employers from liability under all
circumstances. By recognizing these actions, the court preserved the
possibility that the victim of parolee crime might recover from the
parolee's employer; by concluding, however, that, as a matter of
law, proximate causation was lacking in Woods, the court presented
a formidable barrier for any plaintiff to overcome. Although the
court stopped short of precluding negligent hiring and retention
causes of action, their viability must be questioned.
In Woods, the court faced a dilemma created by the conflict between the desire to assure employment opportunities for the parolee
and the desire to compensate those injured by the tortious acts of
parolee-employees. These goals are often irreconcilable because,
even though the parolee-tortfeasor is personally liable to the victim
of his tortious act, he is often judgment proof. By allowing the victim to reach the employer's "deeper pocket," the courts could impose liability on those better able to bear the cost initially.
Employers then could spread the cost of victim compensation to the
general public by raising prices. 0 Pressure on the courts to use this
risk-spreading technique will increase as the public expresses more
interest in crime victim compensation." Unfortunately, the inevitable result of imposing liability upon employers for negligent hiring and retention will be to discourage the hiring of parolees because
employers will avoid the risk of liability by simply not hiring them."2
convicted of a first, second, third or fourth degree felony, authority for a period
of parole to be served in accordance with law after the completion of any actual
time of imprisonment. The period of parole shall be deemed to be part of the
sentence of the convicted person.
D. The court may, in addition to the imposition of a basic sentence of imprisonment, impose a fine not to exceed:
(1) for a first degree felony, fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000);
(2) for a second degree felony, ten thousand dollars ($10,000); or
(3) for a third or fourth degree felony, five thousand dollars ($5,000).
Id. § 31-18-15. It is doubtful that this provision "effectively eliminates" parole because the
authority to grant a parole following the prescribed sentence is retained. In any event,
employers might hesitate to hire anyone with a criminal record, including those on probation
and prior criminal offenders, if employers could be held liable for hiring a person with a
record.
39. Answer Brief to the Amicus Curiae Brief of the State of New Mexico at 2; Santa Fe
New Mexican, Oct. 16, 1977, at D8.
40. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law pt. 11, ch. 4 (2d ed. 1977).
41. See generally Hook, The Emerging Rights of the Victims of Crime, 46 Fla. B.J. 192
(1972); Carrington, Victim's Rights Litigation: A Wave of the Future?, II U. Rich. L. Rev.
447 (1977).
42. Similarly, if liability were extended to the state, either as an employer or as the entity
responsible for releasing safe parolees, the very granting of paroles might be discouraged as the
state sought to avoid the risk of liability.
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Sound legal advice to an employer in such a situation might well be
to avoid all risk by not hiring anyone with a criminal record.
Judicial limitation or expansion of liability provides an imperfect
solution. The extremes are equally untenable: to grant a jury unfettered discretion to determine whether an employee's criminal conduct was foreseeable by the employer may encourage compensation
of victims but it may impair parolee employment; yet total rejection
of the causes of action encourages parolee hiring but leaves victims
uncompensated. An approach between the extremes will necessarily
leave some parolees unemployed and some victims uncompensated.
By recognizing the negligent hiring and retention actions while
maintaining the judicial veto provided by the foreseeability limitation, the court attempted to strike a balance between the dual
policies of permitting victim compensation and encouraging parolee
hiring. Yet, the Woods decision may facilitate neither goal. The
heavy burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff in these actions by
the poorly articulated foreseeability limitation discourages the filing
of such suits. Conversely, no matter how difficult it might be to
maintain negligent hiring and retention actions, they were judicially
recognized in Woods; the resulting uncertainty as to what will be
"foreseeable" may, however, discourage employers from hiring
parolees. Until employers know what their duty of care is and for
what acts of their employees they may be held liable, they will understandably hesitate to hire parolees. The Woods decision could result
in the worst of both possible worlds: it may neither encourage
parolee employment nor permit victim compensation.
Perhaps only the legislature can provide the comprehensive solution the problem requires. The legislature could establish a taxsupported fund to compensate the victims of parolee crime."3 Such a
fund would protect the state's parole program by providing to
victims a source of compensation other than the employer, thereby
reducing the employer's risk of loss and encouraging parolee
employment. The cost of compensation under such a scheme would
be passed on to the general public through taxes. Another potential
solution would be to allow the state to indemnify employers who are
held liable for negligent hiring and retention when they employ
43. Almost half the states have enacted some form of victim compensation assistance. For a
discussion of the various approaches, see R. Meiners, Victim Compensation (1978); Crime Victim Compensation:Hearingson Victims of Crime Compensation Legis. Before the Subcomm.
on Crim. Just. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1975-76);
National Inst. of L. Enforcement & Crim. Just., & Law Enforcement Assistance Ad., U.S.
Dep't. of Just., Victim Compensation and Offender Restitution: A Selected Bibliography
(1975).
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parolees. By contract, the state would promise to pay any damages
assessed against an employer for injury caused by a parolee who was
employed in certain approved positions. An employer, therefore,
would be encouraged to hire parolees. Furthermore, the state's
promise to indemnify employers would assure that potential
employers were aware of the parolee's criminal record and that each
parolee was placed in a position consistent with public safety. Such
individualized indemnification agreements would actively encourage
parolee employment, compensate victims of parolee crime, and help
to prevent the creation of dangerous employment situations which
lead to parolee crime.
CONCLUSION
In F & T Co. v. Woods, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized, but also limited, the availability of negligent hiring and retention causes of action against employers whose parolee-employees
commit certain tortious acts. The decision, however, may frustrate
efforts toward parolee employment and victim compensation.
Recognition of the causes of action may discourage employers from
exposing themselves to liability by hiring parolees, especially in light
of the court's failure to formulate clear standards which would guide
employers in making employment decisions. The foreseeability requirement poses a significant barrier to recovery which may well
discourage victims from pursuing their claims; trial judges can now
deny recovery on the basis that no reasonable jury could find an
employee's tortious conduct to be foreseeable. The proper balance
can only be struck by the legislature through more comprehensive
approaches such as the enactment of a state victim compensation
plan, or a state indemnification program.
MICHAEL COX

